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Metaphoric Sovereignty and the Australian Settler Colonial State
Abstract
There is a pronounced anxiety within Australian jurisprudence at the use of metaphor in the creation of
the law. This essay argues that the anxiety is symptomatic of the fact that metaphor is not only the
source of Australian law, but the source of this law’s very (il)legitimacy. To develop this argument the first
half of the essay focuses on Australian High Court cases that have addressed the use of metaphor in the
creation of the law. Here the essay draws out two observations. The first is the Court’s prohibition against
metaphorical legal reasoning; the second is the fact that metaphor is nonetheless the source of
Australian law. This picks up on Justice Kirby’s observation, that British law was extended over Australia
based on a claim to ‘occupy’ and ‘possess’ a continent upon which the British had barely set foot. The
essay argues that these two observations are connected: the Court’s repudiation of metaphorical legal
reasoning cannot be understood separately from the role that metaphor played in the violent foundation
of Australian law. The second part of the essay is an attempt to think more carefully about how metaphor,
and the metaphor of the body, has shaped and substantiated colonial sovereignty, and how this contrasts
and interacts with First Nations’ sovereignty. The focus here is on a public festival held in 1850 to
inaugurate the Colony of Victoria. The festival involved a public performance in which the colonists gave
expression to their fantasy of being the rightful sovereign of the land, while including First Nations within
it, as a constitutive part of the colonial body politic. But the festival also highlights the failure of the
colonial effort to extinguish First Nation sovereignty through their inclusion. While colonial sovereignty is
metaphorical, First Nations’ sovereignty is ontological – resulting in a state in which Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples are both a constitutive part of the Australian body politic and sovereign First
Nations.
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Metaphoric Sovereignty and the
Australian Settler Colonial State
Shane Chalmers1
1 Introduction
There is a pronounced anxiety within Australian jurisprudence at the
use of metaphor in the creation of the law. Whether it manifests in
an outright prohibition against such legal reasoning (by the Chief
Justice of the High Court in 1937), or a warning of its ‘dangers’ and
a refusal to engage in it (by a majority of the High Court in 2001),
judicial uneasiness at the idea of metaphors as a source of law has
been consistent. This might be understood in terms of a more general
post-Enlightenment distrust of ‘figurative language’, because of its
‘deceptive’ appeal to the imagination rather than to logic (Davies
2017: 130). While few inheritors of that tradition would still deny
the productive, even inescapable role that metaphor plays in reasoning
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980), Anglo-European jurisprudence has been
more reluctant to let go of the fantasy of a purified rationality (in
Hans Kelsen’s terms, this would be a jurisprudence ‘free of all foreign
elements’ (see Davies 2017: 27)). Whatever that might look like, within
prevailing Common Law jurisprudence it means at the very least a
mode of reasoning that uses only recognised sources to determine the
law (Hart 1961), above all the rationes decidendi of previous judicial
decisions, provisions legislated by parliament, along with a range of
interpretive aids such as the maxims of equity. Given that metaphor is
36
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not one of the recognised sources, a judge’s anxiety at basing the law on
a metaphor could be no more than a judicious fear of transgressing the
boundary of legitimate legal reasoning. And yet, while that is probably
true to an extent, I think it misses something specifically Australian
about this anxiety. As an account that focuses on an Anglo-European
preoccupation with the properties and proprieties of legal reasoning, it
misses the historical and material particularities of the High Court’s
disavowal of this mode of law creation. That is the focus of this essay.

My argument, in short, is that the Australian judiciary’s anxiety at
engaging in metaphorical legal reasoning is symptomatic of the fact
that metaphor is not only the source of Australian law, but the source
of this law’s very (il)legitimacy in the country. This has nothing to
do with the illegitimacy of metaphor as a mode of legal reasoning,
and everything to do with the illegitimacy of a law that has violently
dispossessed First Nations based on a metaphorical claim to sovereignty
over their country.
I develop this argument in the first part of the essay through a
reading of Australian High Court cases that have explicitly addressed
the use of metaphor in the creation of the law (all happen to be land
law cases, which in itself is suggestive). My reading draws out two
observations. The first is the Court’s jurisprudential position on the
use of metaphor in the creation of the law, which is to prohibit it, or
at least to refuse to engage in it because of the ‘dangers’ of doing so.
The second is that metaphor is nonetheless the source of Australian
law. This is not my argument so much as Justice Kirby’s observation,
that British law was extended over this country based on a claim to
‘occupy’ and ‘possess’ a continent upon which the British had barely set
foot, which is to say, based on a metaphorical claim. My contribution
in this part of the essay is to suggest that these two observations are
connected: the Court’s repudiation of metaphorical legal reasoning
cannot be understood separately from the role that metaphor played in
the violent foundation of Australian law. In this context – in which the
country was ‘taken away from the original possessors’ (as the colonial
magistrate Edward John Eyre wrote) ‘without laying claim to this
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country by right of conquest, without pleading even the mockery of
cession, or the cheatery of sale’ – in this historical, and very material
context, metaphor as a mode of legal reasoning carries the shame of a
law that cannot escape the dispossessive violence of its establishment.
This leads me to the point: that it is impossible for an Australian judge
to engage in metaphorical legal reasoning without recalling the law’s
foundational violence, and thereby calling into question its legitimacy
as the law of this country. The anxiety is the anxiety at having to
address that question.

The second part of the essay is an attempt to think more carefully
about the metaphorical nature of Australian sovereignty – about how
metaphor, and the metaphor of the body in particular, has shaped
and substantiated colonial sovereignty in Australia, and how this
contrasts and interacts with First Nations’ sovereignty. To do that the
essay shifts registers from the jurisprudence of the High Court to an
historical event. The event is a public festival held in Melbourne and
Geelong over a week in 1850 to inaugurate the creation of the Colony
of Victoria. I focus on this particular festival for two reasons. To begin
with, it involved a collective performance in which the colonists gave
expression to their fantasy of being the rightful sovereign of the land – a
performance which, I argue, helped to make it real for them. This picks
up on Michael Walzer’s (1967) argument, that the modern European
state form depends upon its representation for its reality. In itself such
a state ‘is invisible’, Walzer writes; ‘it must be personified before it
can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can
be conceived’ (Walzer 1967: 194). That, I argue, is what the colonial
festival did. It involved a metaphorical performance of sovereignty – a
very serious kind of play acting in which the several thousand paleskinned invaders paraded around town in their official costumes as if
they were Queen Victoria incarnate. And in doing so – by representing
themselves to themselves, through the festival, as a duly constituted
body politic – the colonists’ transformed the claim to sovereignty that
was set out in the Australian Constitutions Act 1850 (UK) into a reality
that they could sense, love, and truly conceive.
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But what makes this event especially interesting, and instructive,
is not only how it deployed the metaphor of the body in a way that
represented, and thereby reinforced, the Colony’s sovereign claim over
this part of the country. What is unique about the festival is how First
Nations were included in it, as part of the colonial body politic. Focusing
on this inclusion helps to see how the metaphor of the body gave shape
and substance not only to the lawful authority of the colonists but also to
the colonial legal subjectivity of Aboriginal peoples. At the same time,
the festival shows the conceit of the inclusion, that is, the failure of the
colonial effort to extinguish First Nation sovereignty. Quite simply,
while colonial sovereignty is metaphorical, First Nations’ sovereignty
is ‘ontological’ (Moreton-Robinson 2007: 2). Ultimately that is what
the festival shows: how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
have been included as constitutive parts of the Australian body politic,
while remaining ‘occupied’ and ‘possessed’ by this country in ways
that ground their sovereignty in an embodied relationship with it (see
further Moreton-Robinson 2006).
In conclusion I suggest that this points to the kind of state that
‘Australia’ is, and could be – the kind of state that is articulated in the
Uluru Statement from the Heart, in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples are both a constitutive part of the Australian body
politic and sovereign First Nations. For non-Indigenous Australians this
is no doubt a difficult state to imagine, not only because of its apparent
contradictoriness, but more importantly because of its radical difference
to the prevailing imagery of Australian sovereignty as a ‘unified supreme
authority’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2007: 2), a Leviathan-like sovereignty
in which all individual bodies are a subordinate part of the one national
body. For non-Indigenous Australians to conceive of the state otherwise
– to see it, to love it, in a decolonial form – what is needed is a different
set of founding metaphors. It is not for me to say what that might be,
but the metaphor of the ‘gift’ used by Galarrwuy Yunupingu in his
essay ‘Rom Watangu: The Law of the Land’ (Yunupingu 2016: 28) is
surely a good start:
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Acknowledge that we have survived the worst that the past had thrown
at us, and we are here with our songs, our ceremonies, our land, our
language and our people – our full identity. What a gift this is that we
can give you, if you choose to accept us in a meaningful way.

2 A skeleton in every house
What does it mean for metaphor to be a source of law? To begin with,
from the standpoint of the jurisprudence of the courts of Common
Law, that question begs another: can metaphor be a source of law? A
former Chief Justice of Australia’s highest court left little doubt about
his answer to that second question. In a 1937 case studied by most
Australian property law students, Chief Justice Latham rejected the
notion that a metaphor can be the basis of a legal principle. When
asked to decide whether the Common Law protects rights to ‘property
in a spectacle’, Chief Justice Latham’s conclusion was that ‘a “spectacle”
cannot be “owned” in any ordinary sense of that word’ (Victoria Park
Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor: 496) (hereafter Victoria
Park Racing). Such rights ‘could be described as property only in a
metaphorical sense’ (Victoria Park Racing: 497). And metaphors,
according to the Chief Justice, cannot be the foundation of law. ‘Any
appropriateness in the metaphor would depend upon the existence
of the legal principle. The principle itself cannot depend upon such a
metaphor’ (Victoria Park Racing: 497). In this jurisprudence, the value,
and power, of metaphors only extends as far as illumination. Metaphors
cannot be the source of law, although once the law is said to exist they
can help to see it.
And yet, if all that metaphors do is create the literary conditions
to appreciate existing law, then why would a judge contemplate
overturning one? In another Australian High Court case, this time
dealing with native title, Justice Kirby considered the famous metaphor
used by Justice Brennan in Mabo v State of Queensland [No 2] (1992)
175 CLR 1 (hereafter Mabo) – that the Australian legal system has
a ‘skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and
internal consistency’, and which the courts must not ‘fracture’ (Fejo

40

Metaphoric Sovereignty and the Australian Settler Colonial State

v Northern Territory: 150n242) (hereafter Fejo). In his judgment in
Fejo, Justice Kirby expressed disapproval of this ‘metaphor which
suggests both a morbidity and fragility in the foundational principles
of the Australian legal system which I do not detect’ (Fejo: 150n242).
The remark might be understood as simply extending Chief Justice
Latham’s point. If metaphors can illuminate existing law, then they
can also obscure it – hence the need for appropriate images, to ensure
that one can see the law clearly. But the way Justice Kirby expressed
his disapproval suggests he was not merely concerned that the skeleton
metaphor had cast the Australian legal system in a misleading light.
His concern was that it added something to the law, which he otherwise
did not ‘detect’ (Fejo: 150n242).
What Justice Kirby seems to have sensed in 1998 is something that
scholars in the field of law and humanities have become familiar with
over the past two decades. To cite a recent article by Ben Golder, which
draws on Robert Cover’s work, we now know that metaphors have
the potential to be ‘jurisgenerative’ (Golder 2019; on the relationship
between law and metaphor, see also Hanne & Weisberg 2018, del Mar
2017, del Mar 2020, and the special issue of the Journal of Law and
Society 2016). What Golder means by this, and what he shows through
his examination of human rights, is that metaphors have the potential
to shape the nomos, or normative order, that gives a legal system its
meaning and effect. In Golder’s words, metaphors can work ‘to compose
and construct particular realities of law – with material effects for the
way we think and practise law’ (Golder 2019: 304; on the material
effects of metaphor see also the special issue of Theory & Event 2021).
It is this potential of metaphors to shape, and not just illuminate, the
law that Justice Kirby seems to have sensed in 1998. This is even more
evident in the case of Yarmirr v Northern Territory (hereafter Yarmirr),
decided three years later.

On one hand, Yarmirr confirmed that the dominant view of the
Australian High Court in the twenty first century is still the one
articulated by Chief Justice Latham in 1937. When confronted with
the question of ‘what principles of the legal system are, or are not,
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part of its “skeleton”’, the majority of the Court demurred (Yarmirr:
68). ‘Much of the debate’ in the case, they observed, had ‘proceeded
by reference to the metaphor of “fractur[ing] a skeletal principle of
our legal system” used by Brennan J in Mabo [No 2] (280). The use of
the metaphor cannot, however, be allowed to obscure the underlying
principles that are in issue’ (Yarmirr: 68). The majority then cautioned
against engaging in metaphorical legal reasoning. ‘There are obvious
dangers in attempting to argue from the several elements of the
metaphor to an understanding of the principles that lead to the result
that is expressed by the metaphor’ (Yarmirr: 68). Chief Justice Latham
would have approved. Metaphors can illuminate as much as they can
obscure, but they must not provide the basis of legal reasoning.
Justice Kirby took a different view. One of the questions for the
Court was whether the First Nation claimants – the Mandilarri-Ildugij,
Mangalarra, Muran, Gadurra, Minaga, Ngayndjagar and Mayorram
peoples – had native title rights to the sea based on ‘occupation’
and ‘possession’. The judge at first instance had found this to be an
absurd proposition. ‘The very nature of the sea’, the primary judge
wrote, ‘renders it inappropriate to attempt to strictly apply concepts
such as possession and occupation which are readily capable of being
understood in relation to land’ (Yarmirr: 135). Justice Kirby agreed that
these concepts are ‘ill-suited to a description of a relationship between
persons and the sea’, which ‘of its nature’ is not capable of being literally
‘occupied’ or ‘physically possessed’, at least not in the way that land is
thought by an English mind to be capable of occupation and possession
(Yarmirr: 135). Justice Kirby also understood that these concepts failed
to capture the claimants’ own lawful relationship with the sea. Whereas
the Mandilarri-Ildugij people speak of ‘Mandilarri-Ildugij country’,
Common Law judges can only speak of ‘occupation’ and ‘possession’,
or ‘use and enjoyment’ (Yarmirr: 135). However, in Justice Kirby’s view,
for the Court to conclude that the claimants do not have native title
rights based on ‘occupation’ and ‘possession’, because of a lack of literal
correspondence between these concepts and the claimants’ relationship
with the sea, would be to misunderstand both law and language. While
the claimants might not physically possess or occupy the sea, it is the
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responsibility of the Court to ‘give flesh to these concepts’ based on
the claimants’ ‘own understandings of occupation, possession, use and
enjoyment of their sea country’ (Yarmirr: 136). That might require the
Court to extend the Common Law metaphorically, but, Justice Kirby
observed, this would not be the first time that the Common Law had
been extended based on a metaphor.
The very claims to sovereignty in the Crown, made respectively by
Captains Cook and Phillip, over the land mass of a huge continent,
had a similar metaphorical quality, excluding all other claims to
sovereignty. But they had undoubted legal consequences which our
courts uphold. (Yarmirr: 136)

The majority in Yarmirr effectively upheld the prohibition against
metaphorical legal reasoning, due to its ‘obvious dangers’ (Yarmirr:
68). They did not say what those are, but one obvious danger is that
it draws attention to exactly what Justice Kirby observed: Australian
law is born of metaphor. The claim that the British ‘occupied’ and
‘possessed’ Indigenous country that no British person had ever seen,
let alone set foot upon, was clearly metaphorical, and yet it was upon
this basis that the Common Law was said to extend across Australia
– with ‘undoubted legal consequences which our courts uphold’
(Yarmirr: 136). The prohibition against metaphorical legal reasoning
is, in other words, a prohibition against the very act that founded the
Australian legal system (as the High Court observed in Mabo, the
question of ‘the validity of the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty’ is
a question that the judiciary must never ‘canvass’) (Mabo: 33). It is as
if the illegitimacy of that act of creation now taints the method of
creation, so that to engage in metaphorical legal reasoning is to recall
‘the violent structure of the founding act’, to use Derrida’s phrase
(Derrida 1989-1990: 943). Indeed, if metaphor forms the ‘mystical
foundation of authority’ of Australian law (Derrida 1989-1990: 943),
then this would explain the danger of engaging in metaphorical legal
reasoning. As Derrida noted, citing Montaigne/Pascal: ‘whoever traces
it’ – the mystical foundation of authority – ‘to its source annihilates it’
(Derrida 1989-1990: 939). At least that is the fear, and, for Derrida, the
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promise. Because what would be annihilated would be the image of a
law that draws its authority from a solid claim to Right, or Justice, or
Truth. Metaphors are quintessentially representational; to cite Louis
Marin’s definition of representation, they ‘present something in the
place of something else’ and ‘authorise the substituted thing as if it
were the same as the thing being represented’ (Marin 1988: 5-6).
To trace the authority of a law to this source – to acknowledge that
Australian sovereignty ultimately rests on a metaphorical claim, on
an ‘as if ’ colonial imaginary – would be to acknowledge that the law’s
‘ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded’ (Derrida 1989-1990:
943; see also Fitzpatrick 2002, Motha 2015, 2018; on the relationship
between law and representation, and how this is as a matter of the
‘representation of power and the power of representation’, to use
another of Marin’s phrases, see Manderson 2019, 2018, 2000).

If metaphor forms the mystical foundation of Australian law,
then this would also help to understand why, at the moment the
High Court was confronted with the question of ‘the validity of the
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty’ in Mabo – which is the question
of Australian law’s metaphorical origins – Justice Brennan’s reflex
was to turn to metaphor to explain that there are certain questions
the judiciary cannot ask (without risk of ‘fracturing’ the ‘skeleton
of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal
consistency’) (Mabo: 29-30; see also at 43, 45). How did William
Thackeray put it? ‘There is a skeleton in every house’ (Thackeray 1886:
112). For the Australian judiciary, metaphor carries the shame of a law
that cannot escape the dispossessive history of its establishment any
more than it can escape the mystical foundation of its authority. As
Justices Gaudron and Deane wrote in Mabo, the extreme violence of
colonisation, which ‘spread across the continent to dispossess, degrade
and devastate the Aboriginal peoples’, has left ‘a national legacy of
unutterable shame’ (Mabo: 104; see also Manderson 1998). To recite
Derrida, ‘a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding
act’ (Derrida 1989-1990: 943), which makes it impossible for the Court
to speak metaphorically without recalling the metaphorical origins of
its authority, but which also makes it impossible for the Court to not
44
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speak metaphorically, especially when its authority is in question. Just
as ‘silence is not exterior to language’ (Derrida 1989-1990: 943), so too
is metaphor a constitutive part of Australian law.
3 The mystical body of the commonweal
One way to approach the relationship between law and metaphor is
through the concept of jurisgenesis. For Cover, jurisgenesis offered a
way of understanding how legal meaning is realised through a process
that is social, or intersubjective, and that ‘takes place always through
an essentially cultural medium’ (Cover 1983: 11). Cover was especially
interested in judicial interpretation as one such process, and how the
interpretive act of deciding on a meaning of the law from amongst the
multiplicity of meanings that exist under conditions of legal plurality
has the ‘jurispathic’ consequence of denying the legality of those other
understandings of the law (Cover 1983: 40). However, that is a different
concern to the one raised by the High Court’s prohibition against
metaphorical legal reasoning. The question here is not how metaphor
is a source of legal meaning, but how it is a source of legislative power.
In the language of Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, this is
about metaphor as a mode of formation of lawful authority, which is a
question of ‘jurisdiction’ rather than ‘jurisgenesis’ (Dorsett & McVeigh
2012).
For Dorsett and McVeigh, jurisdiction is the ‘first question of
law’, in that it directs attention to how lawful authority is shaped
by the activity or process of giving expression to the law (Dorsett
& McVeigh 2012: 5). This is jurisdiction as legal diction, which is a
matter of who is ‘speaking’ the law as much as the mode of speech
(see also Rush 1997). Consider, for example, that originary act of
1770, when Captain James Cook ‘hoisted English Coulers’ from the
summit of Possession Island at the northern tip of Australia, ‘and in
the Name of His Majesty King George the Third took possession of
the whole Eastern Coast’ of the continent (Cook 1770). Or consider
the follow-up act of 1788, when Captain Arthur Phillip again raised
the flag, this time in the place the British called Sydney Cove, in
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a ceremony to establish the Colony of New South Wales (covering
country beyond even Captain Cook’s wildest imagination) (Dorsett
& McVeigh 2012: 64). These acts of raising the flag were, in Dorsett
and McVeigh’s terms, acts of jurisdiction – acts of giving expression
to British law – which had the effect of conferring sovereignty on the
colonists over half the continent, while ‘excluding all other claims to
sovereignty’ (Yarmirr: 136). Thinking jurisdictionally about these acts
draws attention to two things in particular. One: ‘sovereignty followed
in jurisdiction’s wake’ (Dorsett & McVeigh 2012: 64). And two: the
mode of legal diction, or the language of this law, was metaphor. The
Crown acquired sovereignty the moment it was said, in the process of
raising the flag, that the British occupied and possessed country which
no British person literally occupied or physically possessed.

It is in this sense that jurisdiction can be understood to have
shaped lawful authority in Australia: by giving the legislative power
of the colonisers a metaphorical foundation. I write this in the past
tense, but of course foundations are constantly being re-set (Derrida
1989-1990: 941). Just as settler colonialism is a dynamic structure and
not a one-off event (Nichols 2020: 87-91; Wolfe 2006: 390), so too is
jurisdiction, and the lawful authority, subjectivity, and relations that
it shapes. It is therefore instructive to turn to another foundational
moment in the colonial history of Australia to consider how sovereignty
was being refounded, or reinstituted, some seventy-five years after the
flag-raising ceremonies of 1770 and 1788. The occasion was a festival
held in 1850 to celebrate the inauguration of the Colony of Victoria
(see also Chalmers 2021). The colonists of Port Phillip District had
received the ‘glorious news’ that their Imperial Parliament in London
had passed the Bill that would grant them independence from New
South Wales (Melbourne Morning Herald 11 November 1850). As one of
their newspapers announced: ‘The long oppressed, long buffetted Port
Phillip, is at length an independent colony, gifted with the Royal name
of Victoria’ (Melbourne Morning Herald 11 November 1850). Under the
Australian Constitutions Act, the ‘new-born colony’ (Melbourne Morning
Herald 11 November 1850) would have a Governor and Legislative
Council, with ‘Authority to make Laws for the Peace, Welfare, and
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good Government’ of the Colony, as well as its own judicial apparatus,
including a Supreme Court (Australian Constitutions Act 1850 (UK):
ss 14, 28, 29).

In anticipation of their sovereign status within the British Empire,
the Port Phillip colonists organised a week-long festival. The main
event was a parade, or rather two parades, staged in the cities of
Melbourne and Geelong, which drew together in a single marching
mass the District’s ‘constituted authorities’ and ‘associated bodies’ (The
Argus 28 September 1850: 2). In Melbourne this included a Native
Mounted Police unit, which rode at the head of the parade behind
the Chief Constable (The Argus 19 November 1850: 1). The police
unit had been established shortly after colonisation of the District in
the 1830s, with the objective of ‘civilising’ the Aboriginal peoples of
the region by ‘forming a body of Aboriginal Blacks under European
Superintendence’ (regulations establishing the Native Police Corps
cited in Fels 1986: 17-18). The members of the Native Police Corps
no doubt had their own motives for joining it, and were able to use it
to their advantage while maintaining a connection to country as First
Nations (Fels 1986). But from a colonial perspective, the image of the
‘Black Troopers’ riding erect at the head of the parade, dressed in the
Queen’s uniform as one of the colony’s own ‘constituted authorities’,
represented the achievement of their Civilisation (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. William Strutt, Aboriginal Black Troopers, Melbourne police with
English Corporal (Strutt 2018)

To a British colonial mind, the Aboriginal members of this unit
had become part of that corpus fictum, corpus imaginatum, or corpus
representatum, known historically as the corpus reipublicae mysticum – the
‘mystical body of the commonweal’ (Kantorowicz 1957: 208-9). And
not just any part: they were of the part that wears the Crown, of the
head, which sits atop the body politic as its executive organ (for ‘just
as men are joined together spiritually in the spiritual body, the head of
which is Christ..., so are men joined together morally and politically in
the respublica, which is a body the head of which is the Prince’) (Lucas
de Penna cited in Kantorowicz 1957: 217).
Although there was nothing especially new about this. At the time
it was already common for the colonists to seek to include Aboriginal
people in this way, through the institution of the Native Police Corps,
and so as an act of jurisdiction the Melbourne parade did little more
than represent existing forms of lawful authority and subjectivity. The
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parade in Geelong was different. At ‘an early hour’, the newspapers
reported, ‘the town began to fill with people from the surrounding
villages – all the shops were closed, and the inhabitants congregated
in the Market Square, in order to swell the public procession’ (Geelong
Advertiser 20 November 1850: 2). At the head of the parade marched
the Chief Constable and a Police Corps made up of white colonists,
followed by ‘the Blacks’, a group of Wadawurrung people who had
been invited to join the festival (Geelong Advertiser 20 November 1850:
2). ‘To the delight of thousands’ the Wadawurrung people marched,
appearing ‘as dignified and as important as if they de facto possessed
that soil which they proudly walked over’ (The Argus 22 November
1850: 2). Carrying ‘spears, and boomerangs, and liangles’, ‘un-terrified
by the thousands that surrounded them, and un-heedful of the shouts
that greeted them’ (The Argus 22 November 1850: 2), they proceeded
through the streets of Geelong, ‘the observed of all observers’ (Geelong
Advertiser 21 November 1850: 2). The most striking detail was the
banner under which they walked. A journalist described what he saw:
‘They walked, aye, and a gay flag flaunting over them’; how they ‘gaze[d]
upon it as if it contained the charter of their deliverance. Let us see the
design and motto – a war spear, crossed by a boomerang, supporting a
shield, with the following inscription: DE INDEPENANT ORDER
OF BLACK FELLOWS’ (The Argus 22 November 1850: 2).

Unlike in Melbourne, the Wadawurrung people were not included
at the head of this parade, as members of the Native Police Corps.
Instead they had been invited to participate as a ‘friendly society’. At
the time, friendly societies were one of the most important types of
mutual aid organisation. Under the Act to Regulate Friendly Societies in
the Colony of New South Wales, 7 Vict 10 (1843), ‘any number of persons’
were authorised ‘to form themselves into, and to establish a society,
for the purpose of raising [...] a stock, or fund, for the mutual relief or
maintenance of all’. Major friendly societies included the Melbourne
Union Benefit Society, as well as the groups that marched in the
Geelong parade behind the Independent Order of Black Fellows: the
Independent Order of Rechabites, the Grand United Order of Odd
Fellows, and the Independent Order of Odd Fellows. The pun, in
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naming the Independent Order of Black Fellows after this last group,
was not lost on the colonial audience (as a journalist noted, ‘could
one forget the burlesque of the thing we could forgive the harmless
innocence of the inscription’) (The Argus 22 November 1850: 2). But
behind the apparently parodic movement was another very serious
move: a new way for the colonists to incorporate Aboriginal people
within the Queen’s body politic, not at the head but in the governed
part, alongside other civil society organisations (to use a more
contemporary term). Whether or not the Wadawurrung people ‘gazed
upon’ their banner as if it ‘contained the charter of their deliverance’
(The Argus 22 November 1850: 2), from a colonial perspective that was
the banner’s effect. To be included in the parade – to be a representative
of the new-born colony – one had to march as part of a ‘constituted
authority’ or an ‘associated body’ (The Argus 28 September 1850: 2). By
signifying the charter of a friendly society, the Wadawurrung people’s
banner authorised their inclusion as one of the Colony’s associated
bodies, formed under the Act to Regulate Friendly Societies in the Colony.

Like the Melbourne parade, the parade in Geelong involved an act
of jurisdiction that helped to give shape and substance to the lawful
authority of the Colony as well as to the colonial legal subjectivity of
Aboriginal peoples. And in both, metaphor was the mode of legal
diction. Those several thousand European invaders of Aboriginal
country were able to show and see themselves as a ‘unified supreme
authority’ (Moreton-Robinson 2007: 2), while feeling it in their bones.
The parade was a medium through which they could give expression to
their fantasy – of being the rightful sovereign of this land – through a
collective performance that made it even more real for them. But what
occurred in Geelong was also unique. Like the parade in Melbourne,
the Geelong parade used the metaphor of the body in a way that
represented and reinforced the Colony’s sovereign status, and that
included Aboriginal people while excluding their sovereignty as First
Nations. But it did so in a way that also prefigured a legal institution
that has come to govern relations between Aboriginal peoples and
the colonial state in the twenty-first century. The parade in Geelong
was one of the earliest instances of Aboriginal peoples being included
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within the colonial body politic, not in the form of a police corps, but
as a kind of civil corporation – a form that Aboriginal peoples are still
required to take in order to be visible and audible to the colonial state
today (see, eg, the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander)
Act 2006 (Cth) and Native Title Act 1993 (Cth); on the rise of the
Indigenous corporation see Rowse 2015, 2012: ch 6).
4 Conclusion
A ‘state is invisible’, Walzer wrote in his 1967 essay ‘on the role of
symbolism in political thought’; ‘it must be personified before it can
be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be
conceived’ (Walzer 1967: 194). To comprehend the constitution of
a ‘state’ therefore requires attention to the modes of representation
that give it shape and substance. In jurisprudential terms, one must
consider how ‘sovereignty followed in jurisdiction’s wake’ (Dorsett &
McVeigh: 64). The result is a plural formation that obtains its shape
and substance through the organisation and representation of ‘an
eminently contested and heterogeneous set of practices and ideas’
(Matthews 2021b: 50; see also Matthews 2021a). At the same time, in
the dominant tradition coming out of Europe, the resulting sovereign
formations have tended to have something in common. Neill Walker
summarises this commonality as an image of ‘ultimate authority that
supplies unity and order to a political community’ (Walker 2020: 372;
the notion of ‘sovereign formations’ comes from Buchanan, Motha &
Pahuja 2012; see also Joyce 2012, Olson 2016). There is a passage from
Proust which captures the dynamic of this formation. ‘I was not one
man only’, Proust’s narrator tells us,
but the steady advance hour after hour of an army in close formation,
in which there appeared, according to the moment, impassioned men,
indifferent men, jealous men… In a composite mass, these elements
may, one by one, without our noticing it, be replaced by others, which
others again eliminate or reinforce, until in the end a change has been
brought about which it would be impossible to conceive if we were a
single person. (Cited in Spivak 1997: xi; italics in original)
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In short, sovereignty is understood in this European tradition as
a kind of superstructural formation (in the sense of Williams 1973),
which governs and regulates the bodies of individuals as much as it
is shaped and substantiated by them. This differs radically from an
Aboriginal understanding of sovereignty. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson
explains, Aboriginal sovereignty ‘is embodied, it is ontological (our
being) and epistemological (our way of knowing), and it is grounded
within complex relations derived from the intersubstantiation of
ancestral beings, humans and land’ (Moreton-Robinson 2007: 2; see
also Moreton-Robinson 2006). One difference can be seen in how
the corporeal body features in these broadly defined traditions. In the
European tradition, the body is split between the ‘body natural’ and the
‘body politic’, with the latter drawing its authority from its metaphorical
connection to the former. In the Aboriginal tradition that MoretonRobinson describes, the body is not divided and doubled along this
Christian political-theological axis. Rather, it is a site of connection
with ancestral beings and country, which is what makes the corporeal
body itself ‘lawful’, and sovereignty ‘embodied’ as a corpo-reality. The
difference, to put it crudely, is between the body as a (metaphorical)
source of sovereignty, and the body as (literally) sovereign.

That is why Aboriginal sovereignty continues regardless of the
incorporation of Aboriginal peoples within the colonial body politic.
This could be seen at the 1850 festival. One of the colonists who
witnessed the parade in Geelong noted how the ‘white blankets’ which
the Independent Order of Black Fellows wore ‘contrasted strongly with
the black faces’, which contributed to their appearance as ‘resuscitated
denizens of the graveyard’ – as skeletons, in the flesh (Geelong Advertiser
21 November 1850: 2). Once noticed, the colonist could not unsee it.
In the evening after the parade the Wadawurrung people staged their
own event in Market Square. As ‘the sun went down’, the colonist
reported, a ‘fearful looking pageant’ emerged from out of the crowd:
the blacks have cast aside their blankets, see! they have completed
a strange toilet, – some have their bodies spotted in white circles,
others streaked in long lines of red from the waist downwards, and
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again across the ribs, giving them the appearance of a ‘raw skeleton’.
(Geelong Advertiser 21 November 1850: 2)

As a mode of legal diction, metaphor, and the metaphor of the
skeletal body in particular, has worked jurisdictionally in Australia
to give shape and substance to a colonial sovereignty that includes
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples while extinguishing
their sovereignty. But the sovereignty of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples is not metaphorical – it cannot be ‘extinguished’ by
colonial jurisdiction. ‘Our sovereignty is carried by the body’, MoretonRobinson writes (Moreton-Robinson 2007: 2). Perhaps that is why
the pun, in naming the Wadawurrung group the Independent Order
of Black Fellows, was so unsettling to the colonists (‘could one forget
the burlesque of the thing we could forgive the harmless innocence of
the inscription’) (The Argus 22 November 1850: 2). It named the fact
that while the Wadawurrung people marched as a constitutive part of
the colonial body politic, they did so as sovereign bodies – as a truly
Independent Order of Black Fellows.

The skeleton metaphor has been critiqued for the way it puts
beyond question the most fundamental questions of Australian law.
However it seems to me that, as a description of the legal system that
was brought to this country upon its invasion in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, it is the perfect metaphor. Not only does it draw
attention to the metaphorical origins of Australian law, but it also helps
to imagine this law’s mortality. Australian law more often figures as
a disembodied omnipresence, more spirit than skeleton. This law is
supposed to be god-like, while skeletons are the stuff of mortal bodies,
prone to disease, decay, death. Skeletons can be fractured; and they
will be buried, cremated, discarded. Although they are also capable of
change, of forming new relationships, of giving birth to new bodies.
In the first part of the essay I argued that metaphor forms
the ‘mystical foundation of authority’ of Australian law; that to
acknowledge this is to acknowledge that the law’s ‘ultimate foundation
is by definition unfounded’ (Derrida 1989-1990: 943); and that the
‘danger’ of such an acknowledgement is the ‘annihilation’ of this law’s
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authority. And yet, as I have tried to show through the second part
of the essay, this would not be a nihilistic annihilation and instead a
regenerative one. The image of a law that draws its authority from a
solid claim to Right or Justice based on an original ‘occupation’ and
‘possession’ of this country might be annihilated, but this would enable
the state to be refounded on a new metaphor or set of metaphors – ones
which can help non-Indigenous peoples to imagine Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples as a constitutive part of the Australian
body politic and as sovereign First Nations. ‘Decolonisation’ might not
be a metaphor (Tuck & Yang 2012, Garba & Sorentino 2020), but the
colonisation of Australia is metaphorical as a matter of law (see also
Veracini 2022), and new metaphors for the twenty first century can
be part of the decolonial process. At the very least this would be one
‘meaningful’ way to respond to Yunupingu’s call, to ‘Acknowledge that
we have survived the worst that the past had thrown at us, and we are
here with our songs, our ceremonies, our land, our language and our
people – our full identity. What a gift this is that we can give you, if
you choose to accept us in a meaningful way.’ (Yunupingu 2016: 28)
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